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A Critique of Jurisdictionality
Scott Dodsont
ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, and culminating in a quartet of cases
decided in the last two terms, the Supreme Court has erected a framework for determining when a rule is "jurisdictional." This framework
is important because questions of jurisdictionality routinely come up
in federal litigation. Pressing the virtues of simplicity and clarity in
jurisdictional rules to avoid the costs of mistaken assumptions of jurisdiction, the framework deploys clear-statement rules and formalistic, rule-based tests in an effort to be, in the Court's words, "easy to
apply" and "readily administrable." In this article, I expose the weaknesses of the Court's framework and show that the framework is neither administrable nor easy to apply, creates incoherence, and relies
on shaky internal foundations. I then offer a series of fixes to the

Court's framework to shore up its foundations.
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INTRODUCTION

Since recognizing in 1998 that "jurisdiction ... is a word of
many, too many meanings," 1 the Supreme Court has engaged in a deliberate effort to bring discipline to the process of characterizing a rule
as either jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. 2 That effort is to be applauded for several reasons. First, because parties and courts are prone
to characterizing a rule as jurisdictional when they really mean emphatic, important, or mandatory, the Court's effort has brought more
attention and care to the use of the jurisdictional label by courts and
litigants.3 Second, because Congress often drafts statutes without
clearly indicating whether they address a court's jurisdiction, the
Court's effort has advanced clearer principles for resolving the characterization inquiry.4 Third, because questions of jurisdictionality
arise frequently, and because late-discovered jurisdictional transgressions waste significant judicial and litigant resources, the Court's effort appropriately seeks solutions for a pervasive and harmful problem.5
The result of this effort has culminated in the articulation of a
tripartite framework for resolving jurisdictional characterizations,
which the Court set out authoritatively in 2017 in Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago.6 The Court has declared this
framework "readily administrable ' 7 and "clear and easy to apply"' 89
virtues it regularly strives to achieve in jurisdictional doctrine.
Yet despite the Court's positive efforts, a set of new complications and oddities in the Court's jurisprudence has arisen. These infirmities suggest that the Court's framework is not-and may never be-

1.

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).

2. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionand Its Effects, 105 GEo. L.J. 619, 620-21
(2017) (describing the effort).
3. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of "Drive-By" JurisdictionalRulings, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 947, 947-48 (2011) (detailing and commending the

Court's decisions).
4. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text (describing such principles).
5.

See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2008) ("The

Court is right to be attentive. Whether a rule is jurisdictional or not affects both litigants and the courts in important ways.").
6.

138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017).

7.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513-16 (2006).

8.
9.

Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20.
See infra text accompanying notes 40-41 (describing features of the tripartite

framework).
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as clear, easy, or administrable as the Court has professed. As a result,
the time has come to revisit the Court's jurisdictionality jurisprudence.
In this article I expose the weaknesses of the present doctrine
and offer some perspectives for reforming that doctrine in ways that
return to the good progress the Court has made. Part I sets out the
foundation ofjurisdictionality and describes the framework for determining a rule's jurisdictional character. Part II attends to the complications and oddities that affect the Court's framework. Part III then
prescribes some fixes to the existing weaknesses of the framework.
I.

THE FOUNDATION

For decades, federal courts bandied about the term "jurisdictional" without much care.10 The Supreme Court greatly contributed
to the carelessness in the 1960 criminal case United States v. Robinson, when it repeatedly characterized the deadline to file a notice of
appeal as "mandatory and jurisdictional," which, in the criminal context, was prescribed only in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.la
The question presented by the facts, however, was not whether the
deadline was "jurisdictional." As the Court itself stated:
The single question presented is whether the filing of a notice
of appeal in a criminal case after expiration of the time prescribed in
Rule 37(a)(2) confers jurisdiction of the appeal upon the Court of Appeals if the District Court, proceeding under Rule 45(b), has found that
the late filing of the notice of appeal was the result of excusable ne2

glect.1

The question presented by the facts of the case, in other words,
was whether the rule permitted late filings based on excusable neglect.
That question could have been resolved by simply characterizing the
deadline as "mandatory,"' 13 which would directly answer the question
of whether the rule permitted a court to excuse late filings. But instead,
perhaps as a way to emphasize the rigidity of the mandatory nature of
10.

See Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23

HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 39 n. 102 (1994) (reporting "thousands of cases"); Mark A. Hall,
The JurisdictionalNature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 399 n.2 (1986)
(citing cases).
11.

361 U.S. 220, 224, 226, 229 (1960).

12. Id.
at 222.
13. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 17 (2005) (per curiam) (explaining that a rule can be mandatory without being jurisdictional); Scott Dodson,
AppreciatingMandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY

228, 231-32, 231 n.22 (2008) (distinguishing between mandatory and jurisdictional

rules).
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the rule, Robinson added the characterization "jurisdictional," thereby
spawning decades of unthinking and profligate use of that term in subsequent lower-court and Supreme Court decisions.' 4
The Court turned a comer in 2004 with Kontrick v. Ryan, when
it characterized as non-jurisdictional Bankruptcy Rule 4004's deadline
for a creditor to object to a debtor's discharge.' 5 Signaling a change in
a remarkable mea culpa, the unanimous Court wrote:
Courts, including this Court, it is true, have been less than meticulous in this regard; they have more than occasionally used the term
"jurisdictional" to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of
court.... Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the
label "jurisdictional" not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction)
and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudi16
catory authority.
And the Court quickly made clear that the unthinking, "driveby jurisdictional" characterizations of Robinson and its progeny were
not controlling.17

Over the next dozen or so years, the Court took Kontrick's admonition to heart and decided approximately a case a year addressing
myriad jurisdictional-characterization issues ranging from copyrightregistration requirementsl 8 and labor-negotiation requirements1 9 to filing deadlines, 20 and from statutory-coverage terminologies 21 to the required content of certificates of appealability.22

14. See, e.g., Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)
(quoting Robinson for the characterization of the statutory and Rule-4-based deadline for filing a notice of appeal as "mandatory and jurisdictional"); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Browder
for the proposition that "the requirement of a timely notice of appeal is 'mandatory
and jurisdictional'); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)
(relying in part on Robinson in construing Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure "as a jurisdictional prerequisite").
15. 540 U.S. 443, 446-47 (2004).
16. Id. at 454-55.
17. See Eberhart,546 U.S. at 18 (criticizing overreliance on Robinson to hold
a rule jurisdictional); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
90-91 (1998) (admonishing that "drive-by jurisdictional rulings" should be afforded
little weight).
18. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010).
19. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 558 U.S. 67, 71 (2009).
20. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011).
21. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006).
22. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 137 (2012).
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Although the Court attempted to develop its new jurisdictionality doctrine within the confines of the precedent it was creating, the
Court largely avoided synthesizing a sweeping jurisdictional-characterization framework until 2017, in Hamer v. NeighborhoodHousing
Services of Chicago.23 Hamer's self-described "clear and easy to apply ' 24 framework contains three factors.
First, because "[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal
court's subject-matter jurisdiction," non-statutory rules cannot be jurisdictional. 25 Thus, limits contained only in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, or Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, among
others, are always non-jurisdictional. 26 Analogously, because only
Congress may define the jurisdiction of Article I agencies, adjudicatory rules set internally by agencies must also be non-jurisdictional.27
Second, a statutory deadline governing case transfer between
Article III courts is jurisdictional. As Hamerput it: "If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article
III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional.- 28 This category seems quite small; to date, only statutory deadlines governing civil appeals and (perhaps) civil petitions for certiorari
have been held to be jurisdictional under this factor. 29 By definition,

23. 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017).
24. Id. at 20.
25. Id. at 17 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004)).
26. See, e.g., id. at 20 (characterizing as non-jurisdictional a time limit in Rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure); Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452 (categorizing as non-jurisdictional a time limit in Rule 4004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 18 (2005) (per curiam)
(characterizing as non-jurisdictional a time limit in Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure). See also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,
370 (1978) ("It is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create
or withdraw federal jurisdiction.").
27. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 558 U.S. 67, 71 (2009) (reasoning that the NRAB's own rules could not be jurisdictional because only Congress
may set the jurisdiction of the NRAB).
28. Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18.
29. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding the statutory deadline
for filing a civil notice of appeal to be jurisdictional); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.
33, 45 (1990) (holding the statutory deadline for filing a civil petition for certiorari
to the Supreme Court to be jurisdictional). It's not entirely clear whether deadlines
governing civil petitions for certiorari would qualify under this factor as a "transfer
of adjudicatory authority" because such a case transfer technically might not occur
until the Supreme Court grants the petition.
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3°
this category excludes both transfer deadlines that are non-statutory
and statutory deadlines that do not involve the transfer of the case between Article III courts.3 1
Third, all other statutory limits are jurisdictional only if Congress clearly so states. Again, as Hamerput it: "In cases not involving
the timebound transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III
court to another, we have additionally applied a clear-statement rule:
'A rule is jurisdictional "[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional .... 3 2
In adopting the clear-statement rule for this category, the Court
has insisted that Congress need not "incant magic words. 3 3 Rather,
"traditional tools of statutory construction," including text, context,
and precedent, "must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural
bar with jurisdictional consequences. ' 34 Nevertheless, this clear-statement rule has proven fatal to all proffered jurisdictional characterizations. Using this factor, the Court has held several statutory limits to

30. See, e.g., Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 (holding a civil-appellate deadline not set
by statute to be non-jurisdictional); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970)
(holding the rule-based deadline for filing a criminal petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court to be non-jurisdictional).
31. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (holding non-jurisdictional the statutory 120-day deadline for a losing veteran to file a notice of appeal
with the Article I Veterans Court); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S.
145, 149 (2013) (holding non-jurisdictional the statutory 180-day deadline for a provider to file an administrative appeal to the PRRB).
32. 138S. Ctat20n.9;seealsoArbaughv.Y&HCorp.,546U.S. 500,51516 (2006) ("If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's
scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed
and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction
as nonjurisdictional in character.").
33. Auburn Reg'lMed. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153.
34. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 (2015).

Spring 2020]

A CRITIQUE OFJURISDICTIONALITY

359

be non-jurisdictional 35 and has never expressly held a statutory limit
to be jurisdictional.36
One assumption and one pre-commitment have driven this tripartite framework. The assumption is that jurisdictional rules have an
immutable set of effects-namely, that they are not subject to equitable exceptions or party conduct like waiver or forfeiture 3 7-while nonjurisdictional rules generally have the opposite set of effects. 38 This
assumption has contributed to the features of the framework that
35. See, e.g., Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019) (Title VII's
exhaustion requirement); Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 409-10 (a limitations period
for filing a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S.
134, 137 (2012) (the statutory requirement for certain content in a petition for a certificate of appealability in a habeas case); Henderson, 562 U.S. at 430 (the statutory
120-day deadline for a losing veteran to file a notice of appeal with the Article I
Veterans Court), Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 149 (the statutory 180-day
deadline for a provider to file an administrative appeal to the PRRB); Reed Elsevier,
Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (the registration condition for copyrightinfingement claims); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16 (Title VII's employee-numerosity requirement). Cases applying a similar test before this factor was fully developed include Scarborough v. Principi,541 U.S. 401 (2004), Irwin v. Dep 't of Veteran'sAffairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), and Zipes v. Trans WorldAirlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

385 (1982).
36. In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008), the
Court held the Tucker Act's filing deadline to be a "more absolute" bar that requires
sua sponte policing by the courts, id. at 134, 139, but the Court very carefully
avoided an express characterization of the deadline as jurisdictional, see Dodson,
supra note 13, at 233. Bowles held a statutory appellate deadline to be jurisdictional,
but primarily based on precedent. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 205-06. And the Court in
Hamer subsequently classified Bowles as falling under the second factor of the
framework. Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18.
37. See, e.g., Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153 ("Characterizing a rule
as jurisdictional renders it unique in our adversarial system."); Henderson, 562 U.S.
at 434 ("Branding a rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction alters the
normal operation of our adversarial system."); Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456 ("Characteristically, a court's subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for
the parties' litigation conduct; a claim-processing rule, on the other hand, even if
unalterable on a party's application, can nonetheless be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.").
38. See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) ("A statute of limitations defense ... is not 'jurisdictional,' hence courts are under no obligation to
raise the time bar sua sponte."); id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have repeatedly stated that the enactment of time-limitation periods such as that in § 2244(d),
without further elaboration, produces defenses that are nonjurisdictional and thus
subject to waiver and forfeiture."). In fairness, some recent cases have appeared to
acknowledge that some non-jurisdictional rules might exhibit the same kind of mandatory nature-at least regarding their insusceptibility to equitable exceptions-as
jurisdictional rules. E.g., Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17.
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minimize jurisdictional characterizations, such as the bar on court
rules and the clear-statement rule for statutes, to avoid the waste
caused by a late determination of a rule as jurisdictional. 39 The precommitment is to a perceived need for clarity and simplicity in jurisdictional inquiries.4 0 This pre-commitment has shaped the development of a framework based on rules that are ostensibly straightforward
and easy to understand and apply rather than on standards.41
II.

COMPLICATIONS AND ODDITIES

Though the Court has declared its framework to be clear and
simple, the framework has generated a number of complications and
oddities that the Court has tended to ignore or gloss over. This part
exposes those infirmities.
A. The FirstFactor
The first factor-that only statutes can be jurisdictional-is actually false in three ways. The first falsity is the supposed exclusivity
39. See, e.g., Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 409 ("Given those harsh consequences [of categorizing a limit as jurisdictional], the Government must clear a high
bar to establish that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional."); Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at
141 ("Courts, we have said, should not lightly attach those 'drastic' consequences
to limits Congress has enacted."); Henderson,562 U.S. at 435 ("Because the consequences that attach to the jurisdictional label may be so drastic, we have tried in
recent cases to bring some discipline to the use of this term."); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at
514-16 (relying on the cost ofjurisdictional characterizations to justify a clear-statement presumption against them).
40. See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2342 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (calling "axiomatic" the virtue of clarity in jurisdictional statutes); Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) ("[A]dministrative simplicity is a major
virtue in a jurisdictional statute ... . [C]ourts benefit from straightforward rules under which they can readily assure themselves of their power to hear a case.") (internal citations omitted); Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 ("Clarity would be facilitated if
courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but
only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction)
and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority."); see also Scott Dodson, The Complexity of JurisdictionalClarity, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1, 10-11, 10 n.27 (2011) (offering other examples).
41. Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 ("The rule of decision our precedent shapes is both
clear and easy to apply."); Auburn Reg'l Med. Cr., 568 U.S. at 153 ("To ward off
profligate use of the term 'jurisdiction,' we have adopted a 'readily administrable
bright line' for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional."); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513-16 (justifying the clear-statement presumption
as a "readily administrable bright line").
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of the first factor. While the Constitution does give Congress power to
control the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the original
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts,4 2 it does not purport to give
Congress the exclusive power to do so. Indeed, long ago, in Wayman
v. Southard in 1825, the Court suggested that court rulemaking-including jurisdictional rulemaking-is a power shared by Congress and
the courts.43 Wayman's intimation is borne out in practice. For many
years, in the tradition of English chancery courts, federal courts exerted some control over their own subject-matter jurisdiction.44 Even
today, federal courts exercise their own jurisdictional control through
a host ofjudicially created doctrines. Common examples include resequencing, which allows a federal court to dismiss on non-jurisdictional
procedural grounds even though subject-matter jurisdiction may be
lacking;4 5 prudential standing, which is considered jurisdictional despite lacking a statutory or constitutional basis;4 6 the old pendent-party
and ancillary jurisdiction, which provided for supplemental jurisdic47
tion prior to the enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute;

42. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1 ("The judicial [plower of the United States, shall
be vested in... such inferior [c]ourts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he [S]upreme Court shall have
appellate [j]urisdiction, both as to [1]aw and [f]act, with such [e]xceptions, and under
such [r]egulations as the Congress shall make.").
43. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
44. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is JurisdictionJurisdictional?,95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1207, 1253 (2001) ("So, too, courts of equity defined their own subject matter jurisdiction by developing unique substantive defenses to the enforcement of rights created at common law."); see also Michael G. Collins, JurisdictionalExceptionalism,
93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1831-32 (2007) (recounting the treatment of jurisdiction as
determined by court rules and pleading practices).
45. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431
(2007) (explaining that a court need not address subject-matter jurisdiction when
declining to address the merits some other way). For a discussion of resequencing
in the context of its effects on jurisdictionality jurisprudence, see Scott Dodson, HybridizingJurisdiction,99 CALiF. L. REV. 1439, 1455-56 (2011).
46. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (identifying situations that
do not warrant an exercise of jurisdiction despite otherwise presenting a valid case
or controversy). Recent cases have (properly, in my view) recharacterized some species of prudential standing as merits issues. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014).
47. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (permitting
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state claims that arise from common facts
with federal claims); cf Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1989) (pointing out the lack of statutory authorization for Gibbs).
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the eponymic doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction; 8 and
doctrines that are jurisdictional in everything but name, like forum non
conveniens.4 9 That Congress has power to control the jurisdiction of
the lower courts does not mean that it has exclusive power to do so.
The second falsity of the first Hamer factor relates to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Constitution sets the scope
of the Court's original jurisdiction but makes no delegation to Congress of power to set jurisdictional conditions or restrictions, such as
timing rules and other mechanisms, for invoking the Court's original
jurisdiction. 50 The Court itself has asserted an inherent power to manage its original jurisdiction by promulgating rules to govern such proceedings, and those rules could potentially be jurisdictional notwithstanding their non-statutory basis.5
The third falsity stems from the failure to appreciate the fact
that Congress may delegate its power to make jurisdictional rules for
the lower courts to the Supreme Court. Congress already has delegated
that authority in several instances, including by authorizing court-created rules "defin[ing] when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes of appeal under section 129 1 " 52 and "provid[ing] for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not
otherwise provided for [by statute]. 53 The Supreme Court has accepted those delegations and promulgated rules under them-

54

rules

that themselves should be jurisdictional despite the lack of any parallel
statutory language. Indeed, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
48. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa. Fe. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266,
274 (1926) ("Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the
conditions essential to its exercise exist.").
49. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
50. U.S. CONST. art. IfI, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all [c]ases affecting [a]mbassadors, other
public [m]inisters and [c]onsuls, and those in which a [s]tate shall be [p]arty, the
[S]upreme Court shall have original [j]urisdiction.").
51. Although the Court's rules regarding its original jurisdiction do not strike
me as characteristically jurisdictional, arguments could be made. Supreme Court
Rule 17, for example, states that "[t]he initial pleading shall be preceded by a motion
for leave to file," Sup. CT. R. 17(3), and it is at least arguable that the failure to file
such a motion could be deemed a jurisdictional defect to any subsequent pleading.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2012).
53. Id. § 1292(e) (2012). See also Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm'n, 514 U.S.
35, 48 (1995) ("Congress thus has empowered this Court to clarify when a decision
qualifies as 'final' for appellate review purposes, and to expand the list of orders
appealable on an interlocutory basis.").
54. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) (prescribing the tolling effect of post-judgment motions); id. 5(a) (providing for interlocutory appeals); FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f)
(providing for interlocutory appeal of a class-certification decision).
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Procedure used to provide that the appellate rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals,"55 but
that language was promptly removed after passage of the congressional delegations because, in the words of the Appellate Rules Advisory Committee, "as soon as FRAP is amended to define finality for
purposes of the former or to authorize interlocutory appeals not provided for by the latter, FRAP will 'extend or limit the jurisdiction of
the courts of appeals.'

56

Rule 23(f), promulgated pursuant to that delegation,57 is a good
example of a non-statutory rule that could be characterized as jurisdictional. The rule provides for interlocutory appeals of class-certification decisions: "A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order
granting or denying class-action certification under this rule ...[if] a

petition for permission to appeal [is filed] with the circuit clerk within
14 days after the order is entered."58 Rule 23(f) thus sets the parameters by which a case moves from the authority of a district court to the
authority of a circuit court. It is hard to imagine anything that would
be more jurisdictional.
Nevertheless, in Nutraceuticalv. Lambert, the Supreme Court
characterized Rule 23(f) as non-jurisdictional under the first Hamer
factor, saying perfunctorily, "[b]ecause Rule 23(f)'s time limitation is
found in a procedural rule, not a statute, it is properly classified as a
nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule." 59 Whether Rule 23(f) is jurisdictional is debatable. But it cannot be non-jurisdictional simply because it is non-statutory. Rule 23(f) is the product of a delegation from
Congress to the Court ofjurisdiction-setting authority. Nutraceutical's
reliance on the first Hamer factor was therefore misplaced.
In addition to its falsities, the first Hamer factor has created
tension with precedent by appearing to silently overrule Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.6" Torres characterized as jurisdictional the requirement in Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that
the notice of a civil appeal must specify the parties taking the appeal.6 1

55.

FED. R. APP.P. I (b).

56. FED. R. APP. P. 1, 2002 advisory committee note.
57. See Agenda Book of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 65-67 (1997),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr-import/CV 1997-05 .pdf (confirming
that Rule 23(f) was adopted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)).
58. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f).
59. 139 S.Ct. 710, 713 (2019).
60. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
61. Id. at 315; see also Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) ("Rule 3's
dictates are jurisdictional in nature.").
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But because no statute codifies Rule 3, Rule 3 cannot be jurisdictional
under Hamer, and thus Torres seems inconsistent with the first Hamer
factor.
The Court could simply reject Torres's jurisdictional characterization as a mistaken "drive-by jurisdictional" product of the Robinson era. But instead, the Court has largely avoided Torres and the
tension it creates. The most glaring example of this treatment is in
Hamer itself-the opinion most directly in conflict with Torres; the
Court neither cited nor acknowledged Torres in Hamer, much less attempted to reconcile Torres with its decision.62
Yet the Court is obviously aware of Torres, for the respondent's brief in Hamer relied heavily upon it.63 Further, a key framework
case, Gonzalez v. Thaler,6 4 essentially reaffirmed Torres based on the
language of Rules 3 and 4, the history of treating time limits (including, apparently, non-statutory time limits) to appeal as jurisdictional,
and the Advisory Committee's conclusion that Rules 3 and 4 are jurisdictional. 65 This discussion and reaffirmation of Torres, just six
years prior to Hamer, makes Hamer's silence on Torres even more
perplexing, especially in light of the obvious tension between them,
and has left Torres's fate unclear and uncertain.
The first Hamer factor thus suffers from three falsities and has
caused unresolved tension with recent precedent.
B. The Second Factor
The second factor-that statutory time prescriptions for the
transfer of a case from one Article III court to another are always jurisdictional 66-- causes some odd anomalies. To date, the only such
time prescriptions that the Court has identified are those governing
civil appeals from district court to appellate court, and those governing
civil certiorari petitions from a court of appeals to the Supreme
67
But other time prescriptions might fit this rule, albeit
Court.
62.
63.

Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 13.
Resp't Br., Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 13,passim.

64.

565 U.S. 134 (2012).

65. Id. at 147.
66. Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 16 ("If a time prescription governing the transfer of
adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the
limitation is jurisdictional; otherwise, the time specification fits within the claimprocessing category.").
67. See supra text accompanying note 29. Presumably, the time prescriptions
applicable to direct appeals from district court to the Supreme Court would also be
jurisdictional under this factor. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a)-(b) (2012) (describing
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uncomfortably. Venue transfer, for example, is a statutory mechanism
for transferring adjudicatory authority from one Article HI court to another. 68 The general venue-transfer statutes do not have specified time
prescriptions in them, but Congress certainly could so provide. And
the MDL venue-transfer provision does have a time prescription:
"Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which
it was transferred .... ,,69 The second Hamer factor thus seems to
make this time prescription for MDL venue transfer jurisdictional,
such that the MDL transferee court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a
transferred case after the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, and that
lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the consent or waiver of the
parties.70

Yet a jurisdictional characterization for a venue rule is more
than a little awkward, for venue has long been deemed non-jurisdictional by the Court,71 and the civil venue statute expressly disavows
that it is jurisdictional.72 Further, the Supreme Court, in Lexecon Inc.
such time restrictions). Other statutory prescriptions might also fit into this category.
See, e.g., United States v. Kalb, 891 F.3d 455 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding as jurisdictional the thirty-day deadline in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2012) for the government to file
interlocutory appeals of district court orders suppressing or excluding evidence).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (establishing when one forum may transfer
venue to another).
69. Id.§ 1407(a) (2012).
70. Other specialized venue-transfer statutes have similar timing provisions.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (2012) (providing for transfer of a criminal case for
certain tax code violations from the district where the defendant currently resides to
the district where the offense occurred if the defendant files a motion "within twenty
days after arraignment").
71. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68
(1939) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts-their power to adjudicate-is a grant
of authority to them by Congress and thus beyond the scope of litigants to confer.
But the locality of a law suit-the place where judicial authority may be exercisedthough defined by legislation[,] relates to the convenience of litigants and as such is
subject to their disposition. This basic difference between the court's power and the
litigant's convenience is historic in the federal courts."); see also 15 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3801 (4th ed. 2018) (distinguishing venue from jurisdiction). But see Dodson, supra note 2, at 636 (making the
case that venue is jurisdictional); 18 U.S.C. § 3241 (2012) (using a venue-like provision to give the District Court of the Virgin Islands "jurisdiction" over certain offenses committed upon the high seas); id.§ 3244 (using a venue-like provision to
set out "jurisdiction" for specific district courts overseeing proceedings related to
transferred offenders).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1390(a) (2012) (stating that venue "does not refer to any
grant or restriction of subject-matter jurisdiction providing for a civil action to be
adjudicated only by the district court for a particular district or districts"); id.
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v. Milberg Weiss BershadHynes & Lerach, has suggested that while
the MDL-transfer time prescription is mandatory,73 it might also be
waivable by the parties and thus not jurisdictionala-a conclusion that
major treatises and a majority of lower courts support.75 One leading
treatise even calls the "Lexecon waiver" an "emerging term" in MDL
practice. 76 How surprised MDL practitioners and courts must be to
find that Hamer invalidates such waivers because the MDL-transfer
time prescription is jurisdictional!
Another infirmity is that some deadlines that must be jurisdictional under the second Hamer factor have non-jurisdiction-like exceptions. The two deadlines that the Court has held to be jurisdictional
under this second Hamer factor are the deadline to file a civil certiorari
petition and the deadline to file a civil notice of appeal. Yet the deadline to file a civil petition can be extended by the Court "for good cause
shown."' 77 And the deadline to file a civil notice of appeal may be extended "upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause" and may
even be reopened after expiration if the district court finds that a party
did not receive timely notice. 78 Now, these exceptions are specified in
the statute, and perhaps Congress can do what it wishes, including creating exceptions to jurisdictional statutes that make them operate a lot
like non-jurisdictional statutes. But that makes for a very odd arrangement under current jurisdictional dogma.
C. The Third Factor
The third factor-the clear-statement rule against jurisdiction-suffers from the most complexity. That is peculiar because a

§ 1406(b) ("Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of
any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objection
to the venue.").

73.

523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998).

74. Id. at 36 n. 1 (leaving open the question whether "a party may waive the
§ 1407 remand requirement by failing to request remand from the transferor court").
75. See, e.g., DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2002) (suggesting that plaintiffs may "consent to remain in the transferee district for trial"); 15 WRIGHT, supranote 71 at § 3866.2 ("The
better view is that Lexecon does not affect the parties' ability to consent to trial in
the transferee court. After all, Section 1407 is not a jurisdictional provision."); id
§ 3866.2 n.29 (collecting cases approving of party waiver of the remand provision).
76. 15 WRIGHT, supra note 71, at § 3866.2 (citing In re Fosamx Prods. Liab.
Litig., 815 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

77.

28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (2012).

78.

Id.§ 2107(c).
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clear-statement rule is supposed to make things easy: if the provision
does not "speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the... courts," 79 the provision should be non-jurisdictional,
end of inquiry.
But the Court has been faint-hearted about rigid adherence to
the clear-statement rule. 8 1 Instead, the Court has declared repeatedly
that Congress need not "incant magic words."8 1 Rather, "traditional
tools of statutory construction," including text, context, and precedent,
"must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with juris' 82
dictional consequences. "
The result is clearly not a clear-statement rule, at least not one
that has recognizable analogues in other areas.8 3 Clear-statement rules
typically do not require consideration of the messiness of precedent or
statutory purpose.8 4 After all, the very purpose of having a clear-statement rule in the first place is to avoid the messiness of ordinary statutory interpretation. Yet the Court has, under the third factor's "clearstatement rule," engaged in substantial interrogations of context, prec85
edent, and statutory purpose.
Worse, these inquiries have resulted in outcomes that are difficult to reconcile. Bowles, for example, treated longstanding precedent as nearly dispositive, while Reed Elsevier overcame precedent
with other considerations.8 6 Bowles also considered precedent on both
the statute at issue and on the broader type of consideration the statute

79.
80.

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982).
For a critique, see Erin Morrow Hawley, The Supreme Court's Quiet Rev-

olution. Definingthe MeaningofJurisdiction,56 WM. & MARYL. REv. 2027,2051-

58 (2015) (critiquing the Court's treatment of the clear-statement rule).
81. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 21 n.9 (2017);
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013).

82. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 US. 402, 408-11 (2015).
83. See generally William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.

593 (1992) (cataloguing and analyzing the range of clear-statement rules).
84. Hawley, supra note 80, at 2031 ("[S]tare decisis ordinarily does not matter
when it comes to clear statement rules, but the Court has recently treated precedent
as dispositive.").

85.

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2007) (using precedent); Reed

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010) (interpreting Bowles); Hender-

son v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440-41 (2011) (using statutory purpose).
86. Compare Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209-10, 210 n.2, with Reed Elsevier, 559
U.S. at 168.
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to consider precedential treatment of
addressed, 87 while Wong refused
88
statutes.
similar-category
Even the Court's treatment of text has not been consistent under the clear-statement rule. In Wong, the Court considered whether
the Federal Tort Claims Act provision stating that an untimely action
shall be "forever barred" is jurisdictional. The five-justice majority
held the language to be "mundane statute-of-limitations language" and
"an utterly unremarkable phrase" 89 that did not speak in jurisdictional
terms or address the power of the courts. 90 The four-justice dissent,
reading the same language, disagreed, 9 1 characterizing the language as
"absolute" and with "no exceptions." 92 To the justices, the clear-statement rule appeared to point in opposite directions.
Further, Wong's result creates tension with John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, a similar Hamer-third-category case.
Each case involved a statutory filing deadline for an initial claim
against the United States in a federal court, and so both cases were
decided ostensibly under the "clear statement" factor of the Court's
framework.
The language of the statutory deadline in both cases was similar: the FTCA-at issue in Wong-made untimely tort claims against
the United States "forever barred," while the Tucker Act-at issue in
John R. Sand-made other untimely claims against the United States
in the Court of Federal Claims "forever barred" until 1948 and just
"barred" after that.93 The history of the two deadlines was also similar
and intertwined. 94 The only real distinction between the cases was the
87. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209-10, 210 n.2; see also Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at
168 ("Bowles emphasized that this Court had long treated such conditions as jurisdictional, including in statutes other than [that the one issue].... Bowles therefore
demonstrates that the relevant question here is not.., whether [the provision] itself
has long been labeled jurisdictional, but whether the type of limitation that [it] imposes is one that is properly ranked as jurisdictional absent an express designation.").
88. See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402,423-28 (2015) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (pointing out prior cases that held similar language in other statutes to
be jurisdictional).
89. Id. at 413.
90. Id. at411.
91. Id. at 423 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The FTCA's filing deadlines are jurisdictional.").
92. Id.
93. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012) (FTCA) with id. § 2501 (1948)
(Tucker Act) and with id. § 2501 (2018) (Tucker Act as amended).
94. See Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("When Congress crafted the FTCA as a tort-based analogue to the Tucker Act, it consciously
borrowed the well-known wording of the Tucker Act's filing deadline.").
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longstanding treatment of the Tucker Act's deadline as jurisdictional,
coupled with the absence of precedent on the FTCA deadline. Indeed,
the Court in Wong relied entirely on that past treatment to distinguish
the two cases. 95 As the dissent pointed out, however, the Tucker Act
precedent would seem at least relevant to the interpretation of the similarly worded and historically intertwined FTCA. 96 Further, the Court
has looked to similar kinds of statutes held to be jurisdictional when
determining whether the statute at hand should be characterized as jurisdictional. 97 In light of Wong, one wonders how a longstanding jurisdictional characterization could ever be established for a particular
statute going forward.
Barely a year ago, the Court split again on a third-factor case
in Patchak v. Zinke,9 8 which called for the interpretation of a statute
stating that "an action... relating to [specified land held in trust by
the United States] shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court
and shall be promptly dismissed."99 A plurality of four justices would
have held the statute jurisdictional because it "uses jurisdictional language" by directing that an action shall not be filed or maintained but
shall be dismissed. 100 According to the plurality, the statute "completely prohibits actions" and thus "is best read as a jurisdiction-stripping statute."101 The three dissenting justices'0 2 disagreed that the statute was jurisdictional. In their eyes, the statute "does not clearly state

95. Id.at 416 (explaining that the distinction between John R. Sand and Irwin
"came down to two words: stare decisis"); id ("The Tucker Act's bar was different
because it had been the subject of 'a definitive earlier interpretation.' . .. What is
special about the Tucker Act's deadline, John R. Sand recognized, comes merely
from this Court's prior rulings, not from Congress's choice of wording.").
96. Id.at 425-27 (Alito, J., dissenting).
97. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010) ("Bowles
emphasized that this Court had long treated such conditions as jurisdictional, including in statutes other than [that the one issue].... Bowles therefore demonstrates that
the relevant question here is not ...whether [the provision] itself has long been
labeled jurisdictional, but whether the type of limitation that [it] imposes is one that
is properly ranked as jurisdictional absent an express designation.").
98. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
99. Id.at 904 (Thomas, J.).

100. Id.
at 905 (Thomas, J.).
at 906 (Thomas, J.).
101. Id.
102. Two justices concurred on grounds that the statute reinstated federal sovereign immunity and thus did not reach the jurisdictionality issue, id at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), though one of those concurring justices did indicate specifi-

cally said that the statute "should not be read to strip the federal courts of
at 913 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
jurisdiction," id.
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that it imposes a jurisdictional restriction."'10 3 Again, the clear-statement rule was of little use.
These opinions and outcomes suggest that the Court's clearstatement rule is not particularly effective at streamlining and simplifying the inquiry or producing consistent results. 104
D. The Factors Combined
If each factor on its own generates uncertainty and confusion,
then consider the anomalies created by the interplay of the factors.
One anomaly concerns criminal and civil-appellate deadlines.
The time to file a notice of appeal is prescribed by statute for civil
cases but only by rule for certain criminal cases.1 0 5 As a result, the
statutory civil deadline is jurisdictional (at least after Bowles), but the
non-statutory criminal deadline cannot be.1" 6 The same anomaly inheres in the deadline to file a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court: the civil deadline is jurisdictional because it is in a statute, yet
the criminal deadline is non-jurisdictional because it is set out only in
a court rule.10 7 It is difficult to fathom a compelling reason-and the
Court has not attempted to offer one-why the civil versions of the

103. Id. at 918-19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
104. The lower courts routinely suffer similar difficulties applying the clearstatement rule. See, e.g., Myers v. Comm'r of IRS, 928 F.3d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(split-panel decision on whether the 30-day deadline in 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(4)
(2012) to file an appeal of an IRS determination with the Tax Court is jurisdictional);
Fed. Educ. Ass'n - Stateside Reg. v. Dep't of Def., 898 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(split panel holding jurisdictional the 60-day deadline under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)
(2012) to file a petition for review of a MSPB decision with the Federal Circuit),
reh'g denied, 909 F.3d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (opinions of four judges dissenting
from denial of rehearing).
105. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (providing a deadline for civil appeals) with
FED. R. APP. P. 4 (providing a deadline for all appeals). A statutory deadline applies
to appeals of certain criminal matters by the United States government. See 18
U.S.C. § 3731.
106. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 21 (2017)
(holding non-statutory deadlines cannot be jurisdictional).
107. Compare28 U.S.C. § 2101 (c) (establishing the deadline for civil certiorari
petitions), and Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990) (holding the civil certiorari deadline jurisdictional), with SuP. CT. R. 13.1 (setting out the same deadline for
criminal certiorari petitions), and Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596, at 598 (1968)
(categorizing the criminal deadline non-jurisdictional), and with ROBERT L. STERN
ET AL., SuPREME COURT PRACTICE

278-80 (7th ed. 1993) (explaining that the Court

has long held the civil certiorari deadline to be jurisdictional but the criminal certiorari deadline to be non-jurisdictional).
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certiorari deadlines should be categorized as jurisdictional and the
criminal versions should not.
More oddities lurk. The statutory civil certiorari deadline applies regardless of whether the reviewed court is a federal court or a
state court.108 When certiorari is from an Article III court, then the
second factor of the framework makes that statutory deadline automatically jurisdictional. But when certiorari is from a state court or an
Article I court, 109 then that same statutory deadline falls outside of the
second factor and instead must be evaluated according to the third factor's presumption againstjurisdictionality.11 0 The Court's framework
thus subjects the same statutory provision to different analyses depending upon the circumstances, perhaps resulting in the peculiar conclusion that the civil certiorari deadline is jurisdictional for some petitions but non-jurisdictional for others. 11
Similarly, Congress has provided for appellate jurisdiction of
bankruptcy orders in 28 U.S.C. § 158. Bankruptcy courts are non-Article III courts, but they are the front line for bankruptcy proceedings.
Initial appeals of decisions of bankruptcy courts can be to either a
United States district court (an Article III court) or to a bankruptcy
appellate court (a non-Article III court). "12 The statute further provides
that second appeals of those initial appellate decisions may be filed in
a United States court of appeals, but, for certain appeals, only if the
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (setting the deadline for "[a]ny other appeal or
any writ of certiorari intended to bring any judgment or decree in a civil action").
109. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (providing for Supreme Court certiorari review
of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). See also Ortiz v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2018) (holding certiorari jurisdiction from a decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces to be constitutional); United States v. Coe, 155
U.S. 76, 86 (1894) (upholding Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over Article IV
territorial courts); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-10 (1973) (allowing
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over Article I District of Columbia courts).
110. But see Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 512 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating, without engaging any presumption, that the deadline "restricts
this Court's jurisdiction over state civil cases to those in which review is sought
within 90 days").
111. If the Court were to modify its framework to include in the second factor
transfers between state and federal courts, then it would run up against the removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-47, which includes many timing prescriptions involving
such transfers, which the lower federal courts have roundly declared non-jurisdictional. See Scott Dodson, In Search ofRemoval Jurisdiction,102 Nw. U. L. REV. 55,
64-65 (2008) (noting uncertainty in the lower courts about whether the removal statutes are jurisdictional or procedural in character).
112. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (providing for appeal to the district court),
with id §§ 158(b)-(c) (providing, upon consent of all the parties, for appeal to a
bankruptcy appellate court).
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initial appellate body issues a certificate of appealability. 113 One of the
ways the initial appellate body (either the district court or the bankruptcy appellate court) can issue a certificate is if a majority of the
appellate parties request it, but only if the request is "made not later
than 60 days after the entry of the judgment, order, or decree."' 1 4 This
timing deadline for requesting a certificate of appealability is statutory
but, depending upon the circumstances, could be the predicate for an
appeal from an Article III court (in which case it would be jurisdictional under the second factor) or a non-Article III court (in which case
it would only be jurisdictional if it overcomes the clear-statement presumption in the third factor). Like the civil certiorari deadline, this
bankruptcy-appeal deadline thus could be jurisdictional for some appeals but non-jurisdictional for others.
A similar peculiarity applies to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a) sets the deadline to file a notice of
appeal in a civil case, which the Court has held to be jurisdictional
because the deadline is also codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). 115 But
certain circumstances require a putative appellant to seek permission
to appeal rather than filing a notice of appeal. The habeas corpus statute, for example, denies certain habeas petitioners from appealing a
district court's denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless
the court of appeals first issues a certificate of appealability. 116 No
statute prescribes a deadline for petitioning for permission to appeal,
but Appellate Rule 5 states that the petition must be filed "within the
time provided by Rule 4(a) for filing a notice of appeal."' ' 17 Thus, for
habeas appellants, Rule 4(a) sets a non-statutory deadline to seek permission to appeal, meaning that Rule 4(a)'s appellate deadline cannot
be jurisdictional for habeas appellants but must be jurisdictional for
non-habeas appellants.
III.

FIxING THE FRAMEWORK

These complications and oddities of the Hamer factors undermine the Court's attestation of a clear and simple jurisdictional framework. The best option would be to rethink the foundations of the
113. Id. § 158(d).
114. Id. § 158(d)(2)(E).
115. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 16(2017)
(stating that "an appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute will be regarded as jurisdictional").
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
117. FED.R.APP.P. 5(a)(2).
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framework, but the Court seems intent on adhering to it.118 Accordingly, I offer three modest fixes to the Court's existing framework.
These fixes would leave some inconsistencies but improve the framework going forward.
The first fix would change the first factor to exempt non-statutory rules from the jurisdictional characterization unless Congress either lacks the jurisdictional-controlauthority in the firstplace or has
lawfully delegatedthat authorityto the rulemaker. This change would
recognize the fact that some non-statutory rules might be jurisdicrules or rules promulgated
tional, such as the Supreme Court's own
19
statutes.
under jurisdiction-delegating
The second fix would be to change the third factor to follow a
more traditionally rigid clear-statement approach in cases calling for
the interpretation of a statute passed or amended after 2006, when Arbaugh first articulated the jurisdictional framework's clear-statement
rule. This fix has a number of advantages. For one, it reflects the realities of the conversation with Congress that the clear-statement rule is
predicated on. Only for new statutes or newly amended statutes is
Congress fairly on notice that, absent a clear use of jurisdictional language, the Court will construe the statute to be non-jurisdictional, notwithstanding prior precedent or purpose. 120 For another, the prospective nature of the fix preserves the Court's cases deploying the more
convoluted version of the clear-statement rule when construing statutes passed or last amended prior to 2006. In those instances, a less
rule is warranted, so no cases
rigid adherence to the clear-statement
12 1
overruled.
be
to
need
would
The third fix would be to avoid the Court's framework altogether in hard cases, such as those in which a statute was passed or
last amended prior to 2006 and whose jurisdictional status is unclear.
Avoidance is possible-perhaps even preferable-because courts can
bypass the jurisdictional determination if dismissal is appropriate on
other non-merits grounds, such as defects in venue. 122 Avoidance is
118. See Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848-52 (2019) (reaffirming commitment to the Hamer framework).
119. See supra Part II(A).
120. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621,
688 (1990) (arguing, for this reason, that clear-statement rules should be applied
only prospectively).
121. Patchak,perhaps fortuitously, lacks a controlling rationale.
122. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422, 431
(2007) (recognizing that courts have "leeway 'to choose among threshold grounds
for denying audience to a case on the merits"').
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also possible if the rule must be enforced whether or not jurisdictional.
In other words, if the real question in the case is whether the rule at
issue is subject to equitable exceptions or to party waiver, then the
court can answer that question directly in the negative without needing
to reach the jurisdictional question. 12 3 Looking to other grounds to resolve the case-such as non-merits grounds or the particular effects of
the rule-can enable courts to avoid hard questions of jurisdictional
124
characterization.
CONCLUSION

The Court's jurisdictionality doctrine is showing signs of wear.
My primary aim has been to call attention to these fissures and instabilities so that they can be corrected-through rebuilding or repair-before they cause collapse. Perhaps the Court will take up this challenge.
There is, however, a deeper, if often overlooked, problem. The
quest for "clear" and "simple" jurisdictional tests is neither necessarily
noble nor realistically achievable. 125 Complexity-even uncertainty-in jurisdictional tests reflects the doctrinal norm and has its own benefits of improving accuracy and facilitating productive inter-jurisdictional dialogue. 126 If the Court's experiment in crafting a test for jurisdictional characterizations fails to live up to the promise of being
"readily administrable" and "clear and easy," it need not be scrapped
123. Indeed, resolving the narrower effects question addresses the real issue at
stake for the parties, while resolving the jurisdictionality question will either overdecide or under-decide the case by leaving the effects unresolved. See Dodson, supra
note 5, at 6-8 (explaining how deciding the jurisdictional question "risks either overor under-deciding the case").
124. The Court has taken this approach on occasion. See, e.g., Manrique v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1271-72 (2017) (avoiding the question whether a
timely notice of appeal from an amended criminal judgment imposing restitution is
ajurisdictional requirement and instead holding it a mandatory rule that, because the
appellee properly invoked the requirement, must be enforced). Courts of appeals
have taken this approach as well. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 716 F. App'x 182 (4th Cir. 2018) (declining to decide the jurisdictional character of the statutory deadline to file a claim in the U.S. Tax Court because the dispute could be resolved by finding that the deadline was not subject to equitable
tolling).
125. See Dodson, supra note 40, at 13-14, 50-52 (recognizing the uncertainty
and complexity in most jurisdictional doctrines and discussing the costs associated
with "clear and simple" jurisdictional rules).
126. See id. at 52-55 (describing the potential benefits of complexity and jurisdictional uncertainty).
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for that reason alone. If workable despite its complexity, the test would
sit comfortably within a long tradition of such jurisdictional tests.

